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NEPA AT NINE: ALIVE AND
WELL, OR WOUNDED IN ACTION?
C. PETER GOPLERIJD Il*
As this article is being written, the ninth anniversary of the
enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter
NEPA, or the Act)1 has passed without much fanfare. This article
will pause to analyze the "settled" points which have developed
over these nine years. An attempt will also be made to forecast what
the future holds in store for NEPA. The Act, while quite short in
length and seemingly straightforward in language, 2 has had a
rather controversial existence. This article will not attempt to
chronicle the entire history of the Act. Other writers have, at various
points in NEPA's short history, done excellent work in this
respect. 3 Rather, this writer will focus on the Supreme Court's
efforts at clarifying and interpreting NEPA, with particular
attention paid to the .two most recent endeavors. 4 Next, attention
will turn to efforts to streamline and clarify the NEPA process by
'Assistant Professor of Law, Universitv of Akron; B.A., University of Kansas, 1971; J.D.,
University of Kansas, 1974. The author wishes to acknowledge the untiring research assistance
provided by William H. Ehrstine, a third-year student at the University of Akron School of Law.
Special thanks for editorial comments go to Beth A. Burns, also a third-year student at the
University of Akron School of Law.
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976)).
2. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITI TI, FF.DFRAI
ENVIRONMFNTAL LAw 239 (1974).
3. See generally W. RoOGERs, ENVIRONMFNTAI LAW (1977): F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COUtRTS
(1973).
4. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519(1978).
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the Council on Environmental Quality (hereinafter CEQ) through
its newly issued regulations governing NEPA activities. 5 Finally,
the article will discuss areas of potential controversy and the
future role of the Act generally. Underlying this entire project is the
proposition that, contrary to the opinions of some commentators, 6
the courts and the agencies (via court endorsement of their actions)
have done nothing to counteract what has been perceived to be the
intent and purpose of Congress with regard to NEPA. 7
Environmentalists need not dspair; their best interests are still
protected. On the other hand, bureaucrats have perhaps been given
some relief from what was viewed as a burdensome statute. 8
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND NEPA
The Supreme Court has dealt with NEPA at length, in written
opinions, only four times. 9 Two of these decisions, Aberdeen &
Rockfish R. R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(Scrap) (hereinafter SCRAP)10 and Flint Ridge Development Co. v.
Scenic Rivers Ass'n (hereinafter Flint Ridge),11 will be briefly analyzed
first. Following that will be a somewhat closer look at the two most
recent cases, Kleppe v. Sierra Clul (hereinafter Kleppe), 12 and Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC (hereinafter Vermont Yankee). 13
SCRAP represented the first substantive NEPA analysis by the
Court. The case involved a challenge by several environmental
groups to Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) activities with
regard to freight rate increases proposed by the nation's railroads.
Substantively, the environmental focus of the case was on the effect
the rate increase would have upon the use of recycled, as opposed to
virgin, materials. It was SCRAP's contention that the proposed
increases discriminated against recycleables.
The case reached the Supreme Court as a result of a decision
by a three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of C-
5.43 Fed. Reg. 55, 990 (1978) (to be codified in 40 CFR §§ 1500-1508.28) (hereinafter reference
will be made only to the appropriate CFR section).
6. Comment, URB. L. ANN. 225 (1977).
7. W. RooGERS, ENVIRONMENTAl. LAWS § 7.1 (1977).
8. See 115 CONG. REC. 40923-928 (1969).
9. The Court has recently handed down another NEPA case. Andrus v. Sierra Club __ U.S.
__ 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979). In this case the Court held that proposed curtailment in an
appropriation request in the budget of the National Wildlife Refige System was not required to be
accompanied by an EIS, because appropriation requests do not constitute either "Proposals for
legislation" or "proposals for major Federal actions." Id.
10. 422 U.S. 289(1975).
11. 426 U.S. 776(1976).
12. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
13. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
NEPA AT NINE
olumbia 14 which ordered the ICC to reopen a general revenue
proceeding. The court based this order on its view that a final draft
environmental impact statement (hereinafter EIS) should have
been made available during an initial oral hearing conducted by the
ICC to investigate the rate increases proposed by the railroads, and
that the EIS which was eventually prepared was deficient. In
addition to ordering the ICC to prepare a more thorough EIS,I5 the
court ordered hearings held on the statement and reconsideration
of the ICC's decision not to hold the proposed rate unlawful. 16
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District
Court. The Court rejected the argument that a final EIS was due
prior to a final order in a general revenue proceeding.' 7 The Court
stated that the command of section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA that the
EIS "shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency
review processes"' 18 does not pertain to the point in time when the
EIS must be prepared. 19 Rather, the language "simply says what
must be done with the 'statement' once it is prepared - it must
accompany the 'proposal'.' '20 In the context of examining the role
,of NEPA and the procedures used by the ICC to implement
NEPA, the Court also attempted to clarify the NEPA deadline for
EIS preparations. "The time at which the agency must prepare the
final 'statement' is the time at which it makes a recommendation or
report on a proposal for federal action." 2' Since the ICC had made
no proposal, recommendation, or report at the time of the oral
hearing, NEPA did not require that an EIS be available during the
hearing, contrary to the position of the District Court. 2 In
analyzing the sufficiency of the EIS, the Court indicated that the
contents and scope of the statement would necessarily vary with the
type of federal action being taken. 23 In a general revenue
proceeding the crucial inquiry is whether a financial crisis exists to
entitle the railroad to a rate increase. This sort of inquiry raises few
environmental questions. Therefore, the ICC was found to be
justified in preparing a limited impact statement. 24 The Court
buttressed its holding by pointing to a collateral ICC proceeding
14. SCRAP v. United'States, 371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Aberdeen and
Rockfish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289(1975).
15. 371 F. Supp. at 1306.
16. Id. at 1307.
17. 422 U.S. at 320 (1975).
18.42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(1976).
19. 422 U.S. at 320.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 320-21.
23. Id. at 322.
24. Id. at 323-24.
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which devoted more specific attention to environmental issues. 25 In
sum, the Court found that "environmental issues pervaded the
proceeding" 26 and that the impact statement satisfied the
requirements of the Act.
The Court's ruling in SCRAP perhaps initially gave
environmentalists cause for concern. It was thought by some to
eliminate the draft impact statement from the NEPA process. 27 The
Court's handling of the timing of EIS preparation also caused
concern. It seemed to be overruling language in earlier Circuit
Court decisions which mandated early EIS preparation. 28 It was
felt by some that by not requiring an impact statement until the
ICC finalized its order, the Court was going to "severely limit the
effectiveness of the impact statement. "29 Thus, the Supreme
Court's first encounter with NEPA seemed to some to have left
NEPA lying by the roadside, seriously injured.
Ample pause for reflection creates a slightly different analysis
of the case. The matter involved unique agency procedures. 30
Nowhere in the opinion did the court explicitly reject the concept of
the necessity for a draft impact statement. Indeed, following the
decision CEQ issued a memorandum construing SCRAP which
strongly reiterated the position that the Court had in no way
emasculated the draft to final impact statement process. 31 The
Council argued that nothing in the opinion, on this or any other
issue, was inconsistent with the CEQ Guidelines.3 2 Additionally,
the idea of gearing the environmental assessment to the action
being taken does not seem to be inherently bad or contrary to the
intent of NEPA. Federal agencies are charged with a very wide
variety of roles and duties. Accurate and effective environmental
analysis must necessarily be the result of procedures which are
flexible and varied, within, of course, the confines of section 102 (2)
(C) of NEPA.
The most controversial, and perhaps most critical, issue in the
case concerned the timing question. As indicated earlier, the Court
seemed to say the time when a final impact statement is due should
be controlled by the appearance of a recommendation or report on
a proposal for federal action. The Court overruled lower court
25. Id. at 325-26.
26. Id. at 327.
27. Druley, FederalAgency NEPA Procedures, 7 ENVJR. REP. (BNA) Mono. No. 23, 2 (1976).
28. 422 U.S. at 321 n.20.
29. Note, 49 TEMP. L. Q. 223, 235 (1975).
30. 422 U.S. at 322-28.
31. C.E.Q. Memorandum concerning Aberdeen &Rockfish R R. Co. v. S. C.R.A.P. (reprinted in
Druley, FederalAgency NEPA Procedures, 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) Monograph No. 23, App. C (1976)).
32. These guidelines are found at 40 C. F.R. § 1507 (1979).
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decisions requiring early preparation of impact statements . 3 This
ruling could be construed to allow last minute, ad-hoc preparation
of impact statements justifying decisions or projects. However, a
realistic reading of the decision yields a contrary position. An a-
gency is not going to be able to wait until the last minute to prepare
an EIS. Impact statement preparation is a time-consuming
process. 34 Thus, realistically, agencies will have to begin-
preparation of statements well in advance of germination or
announcement of a "recommendation or report on a proposal," or
formulation of a policy, in order to have a "final" EIS at the time
required by the Court in SCRAP. Therefore, at this point in NEPA
development, it could be forcefully argued that the Court did not
really emasculate the Act in the fashion that a cursory reading of
SCRAP might indicate.
The Court's next opportunity to deal with the Act came in
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n.3 5 The Court was
called upon to construe the relationship between NEPA and the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act). 36 The
specific issue facing the Court was whether the procedural
mandates of NEPA must yield in the face of a conflict with another
federal statute. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) is charged with administering the Disclosure
Act. Under the Act a developer must file with HUD a statement of
record and property report containing information about proposed
housing developments. This information is clearly intended to
protect prospective purchasers against fraud and deceptive practi-
ces. It must contain detailed information regarding, among other
things, title to the land, topography thereof, streets, general terms
and conditions of sale and the background of the developer. 37 The
statement becomes effective 30 days after filing, unless the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development determines it to be
insufficient. 38 The Secretary cannot evaluate the substance or merit
of the project., review being limited to examination of the document
to be certain the aforementioned contents are complete.
39
The plaintiffs in this case demanded that HUD prepare an EIS
on a housing development in Oklahoma prior to the disclosure
statement becoming effective. HUD refused to do so and litigation
33. 422 U.S. at 321 n.20.
34. CO INCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL Q1 IALITY, SIXTH ANNI ;AL REPORT OF THE C.E.Q. 639 (1975).
35. 426U.S. 776 (1976).
36. 15 U.S.C. 51701 1-20(1976).
37. 15 U.S.C. 5 1705(1976).
38. 15 U.S.C. § § 1704 (b)(1976).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1706(1976).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
ensued. Both the district court4 0 and circuit court4 ' held that
NEPA applied to HUD and that an impact statement must be
prepared in conjunction with the disclosure statements.
42
The Supreme Court was presented with the issues of whether
HUD's "action" allowing a disclosure statement to become
effective is a major federal action and whether HUD is nonetheless
exempt from NEPA due to a statutory conflict arising from the
Disclosure Act. The Court chose not to deal with the former issue,
finding the latter to be dispositive of the case.4 3 The Court
determined compliance with NEPA is impossible within the context
of the Disclosure Act because of the 30 day deadline under which
HUD must act. 44 Writing for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice
Marshall noted that where a "clear and unavoidable conflict in
statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way." 45 In the eyes of
the Court, this situation presented the epitome of that sort of
statutory conflict. Although the Disclosure Act authorized the
Secretary of HUD to suspend the effectivel date of the disclosure
statement in order to remedy an inadequate disclosure statement, it
did not confer any discretion to suspend the effective date in order
to provide time for preparation of an impact statement. 46 The
Court noted however that the Secretary had the power to
promulgate rules requiring developers to include a wide variety of
environmental information in the property reports required by the
Disclosure Act.
47
On its face this case appeared to be one which would provide
the Court the opportunity to define a "major federal action" under
NEPA. But, as indicated, the Court ducked the question. The two
statutes conflicted even if the approval of the statement could be
termed a "major federal action." ' 48 Failure of the Court to deal
with this question did not diminish the effectiveness of NEPA; nor
did it damage the cause of environmental protection. In fact, by not
defining the term, the Court may have left the lower courts with
more flexibility in interpreting the Act, which might ultimately
prove desirable.
The Court's decision did cause some outcry from
commentators. It was suggested by one that the decision stood for
40. Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn & Flint Ridge Dev. Co., 382 F. Stpp. 69 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
41. Scenic RiverAss'n v. Lynn & Flint Ridge Dev. Co., 520 F.2d 250(10th Cir. 1975).
42. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 783-784 (1976).
43. Id. at 787.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 788.
46. Id. at 789-90.
47. Id. at 792.
48. Id. at 791.
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the proposition that practical inconvenience is a basis for avoiding
NEPA. 49 This writer further argued that since the Disclosure Act
was flexible enough to allow suspension of the effective date, the
case could be read to hold that where a conflict might exist, NEPA
could be avoided. 50 Finally, it contended that the Court could have
interpreted the Disclosure Act and NEPA to require the best
preparable EIS within the 30 day limit.1
This writer suggests that the decision really did little, if any,
harm to the purposes of NEPA, both objectively speaking and from
an environmentalist's point of view. The best possible EIS within
30 days would provide very little useful information in most
instances. The true purpose of the Disclosure Act is protection of
the buyer from fraudulent practices. Preparation of an EIS would
do nothing to enhance this purpose. Furthermore, the federal
action is minimal here; so minimal in fact that a contrary decision
might have created an anti-NEPA backlash in Congress.5 2 Finally,
there is an obvious statutory conflict between NEPA and the
Disclosure Act. As the Court noted, Congress clearly intended
NEPA to yield in the face of such a conflict.5 3 While the Court did
nothing to necessarily support the liberal reading given NEPA by
some lower courts, it clearly did nothing to limit the application of
the Act in Flint Ridge.
The Court's next NEPA case, Kleppe v. Sierra Club,54 stirred
more criticism than either of the previous efforts. The commenta-
tors quickly came out of the woodwork claiming the Court had
emasculated the Act. 55 The case specifically focused on coal
development in Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota and South
Dakota (Northern Great Plains). The Sierra Club and other
environmentally concerned plaintiffs brought suit, contending the
Department of the Interior should prepare an EIS for coal
development of the above region. The District Court ruled against
49. Comment 13 URB. L. ANN. 225, 226 (1977).
50. Id. at 236.
51. Id.
52. Just this sort of backlash has recently been witnessed in relation to the Endangered Species
Act as the result of the Supreme Court's decision in TVA v. Hill, __ U.S. __, 98 S. Ct. 2279
(1978). Immediately following the decision, numerous bills geared towards endangering the
Endangered Species Act were introduced. (See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 446 (1978)) A bill was passed in
the closing hours which arguably does weaken the act. (See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1168 (1978)).
53. 426. U.S. at 788. The Report indicated that the purpose of the language in section 102,
requiring compliance "to the fullest extent possible," is to make clear that agencies shall comply
with the directives of section 102 "unless existing law applicable to such agency's operation expressly
prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible." Id. See H.R. REP. No. 91-
765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) at 115 CONG. REC. 39,071 (1969).
54. 427 U.S. 390(1976).
55. Note, 26 Emory LJ. 231 (1977); Note, 7 Envt'l L. 181 (1977); Comment, 5 Fla. St. U.L.
Rev. 512 (1978); Note, 12 Land and Water L. Rev. 195 (1977); Note, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 484 (1977);
Note, 50 Temp. L.Q. 410(1977).
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the plaintiffs, but this decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
5 6
In resolving the case, the Supreme Court was faced with the
issue of when, and inder what circumstances, a regional impact
statement is required for a group of federal actions. 57 At the
time the Court considered the case, site specific impact statements
had been prepared for individual leases for mining. Interior was
also preparing a national or programmatic impact statement
covering the nation-wide policies for coal development. In
addition, there had also been several studies done in the Northern
Great Plains area, culminating in one initiated in 1972 entitled the
Northern Great Plains Resources Program (NGPRP). The gist of
the suit was that there was clearly an Interior policy for
development of Northern Great Plains coal, thus requiring an
impact statement.
The Court began its analysis by announcing that in order for
the plaintiffs to succeed, there must have "been a report or
recommendation on a proposal for major federal action with
respect to the Northern Great Plains region." ' 58 It then held that
there was no evidence of an action or proposal of a regional nature,
noting that both lower courts had also failed to find evidence of a
regional plan. 59 The Court said that without a regional plan or
proposal there is nothing which could be the subject of analysis in
an EIS. 60 The absence of a regional plan was in contrast to the well-
defined national proposal and the local actions which had already
been the subject of impact statements. 61 An EIS for a less than
clearly defined proposal would be speculative, hazy and unlike that
which is envisioned by NEPA. 62
The circuit court of appeals had ruled an EIS was necessary
at a point in time prior to the formal recommendation or report on
a proposal if a four-part balancing test devised by the court was
satisfied. 63 Using this test, the circuit court had found that
irretrievable commitments were about to be made by Interior and
that other aspects of the test had been satisfied. It did not order
56. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514F.2d 856(D.C. Cir. 1975).
57. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 398 (1976).
58. Id. at 399.
59. Id. at 400-401.
60. Id. at 401.
61. Id. at 400.
62. Id. at 402.
63. Id. The factors to be analyzed in this test include: 1) the likelihood and imminence of the
program's coming to fruition; 2) the extent to which information is available on the effects of
implementing the expected program and on alternatives; 3) the extent to which irretrievable
commitments are being made and ontions precluded; and 4) the severity of the environmental effects
should the proposal be implemented.
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immediate preparation of an EIS, but in its remand did direct the
district court to further analyze the facts for application of the
four-part test as further activity occurred. The Supreme Court
rejected this test as being beyond the power of the courts under
NEPA. 64 The-Court stated that the Act makes it clear that "the
moment at which an agency must have a final statement ready is
the time at which it makes a recommendation or report on a
proposal for federal action. "65
A contention was also made that a regional impact statement
was needed on all of the coal projects in the area inasmuch as they
were intimately related. The Court also rejected this argument. It
did, however, concede that § 102 (2) (C) of Nepa may require a
comprehensive EIS when a number of projects are pending at the
same time in a similar area, or on a similar subject. 66 "When
several proposals for coal-related actions that will have cumulative
or synergistic environmental impact on a region are pending
concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences
must be considered together. "67 The Court also indicated in a
footnote that it is not necessary to have a completed comprehensive
or cumulative impact statement prior to approval of any of the indi-
vidual projects within the overall program. 68
As noted above, it was not long before the critics attacked the
Court's analysis in this case. The general line of comments dealt
with the contention that the Court had emasculated the Act by
reiterating its statements in SCRAP regarding the timing of EIS
preparation. One commentator felt the requirement of an agency
proposal to trigger judicial intervention in the NEPA process would
stifle environmental planning. 69 The critics further argued the
courts' role as a "watchdog" over NEPA was diminished by the
Kleppe decision. 70 The Court's failure to clarify what is meant by
"proposal" has been argued to be yet another defect in the
opinion. This omission leaves the agencies in limbo as to when to
prepare a final statement; it does not aid the lower courts in
determining when their scrutiny of agency actions is proper; and it
leaves potential plaintiffs at a loss as to when they may validly
challenge agency actions. 7 It has even been contended that the
64. 427 U.S. at 406.
65. Id. (quotingfromS. C.R.A.P., 422 U.S. at 320).
66. 427 U.S. at 409.
67. Id. at 410.
68. Id. at 414 n.26.
69. Note, 50 Temp. L. Q. 410, 418 (1977).
70. Comment. 5 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 512, 524(1978).
71. See Note, 26 Emory L.1. 231 (1977); Note, 7 Envt'l L. 181 (1977).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
decision can be read as requiring an explicit, formally announced
agency proposal before a final EIS is due under NEPA.
72 If
accepted, this argument paves the way for NEPA avoidance up to
the point of irreversible commitments of resources. The argument
was made that early environmental input in the decision-making
process was gone.
73
Further criticism has also been leveled at the Court for its
handling of the question of cumulative or programmatic impact
statements. Because programs, particularly research and
development policies, are not always clearly defined, it was feared
that challenges must be aimed at each individual step of a project;
at each individual impact statement. 74 This approach was viewed
as a problem for everyone involved. It would increase litigation,
not reduce it as hoped. The environmental groups must plan to be
in court continuously. It also appeared that a programmatic EIS
could, under the Court's decision, be used to hide problems with
individual aspects of a large proposal, once it was found to exist.
In the time which has intervened since Kleppe was decided,
NEPA has not died, the environment has not been forever
degraded, and agencies have not retreated back into their little
worlds at the expense of the environment. All of this is true because
the decision was not as far-reaching as some commentators argued.
The decision, like the two alread, discussed, must be limited to its
facts. 75 There was nothing which resembled a regional approach or
proposal for coal development. Even the court of appeals did not
contend one existed. A national programmatic EIS was being
prepared and numerous localized impact statements existed. The
Department of Interior was not blatantly ignoring its
environmental responsibilities here. As all the parties appeared to
concede, "approval of one lease or mining plan did not commit the
Secretary to approval of any others." 
76
While this writer would admit disagreement with the Court as
to how "clearly" NEPA indicates the timing of final EIS
preparation, such disagreement does not lead to a fatalistic view of
the decision. The same could be said for the fact the Court did not
define or clarify what is meant by a "proposal." Such a definition
would be helpful, but lack of one does not spell doom for the Act.
Early environmental thought and planning is still possible, indeed
72. Comment, 5 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 512 (1977).
73. Note, 50 Temp. L. Q. 410, 419 (1977).
74. Note, 26 Emory L.J. 231, 253(1977).
75. For a contrary view, see Comment, 5 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 512, 521 (1977).




required. As the Court itself noted,7 7 consultation with other
federal agencies which have jurisdiction or expertise in the matter
at hand is required prior to preparation of an impact statement. 78
The final impact statement is not created in a vacuum.
Consideration of environmental factors must necessarily occur
prior to filing a final environmental impact statement. 79 The Court
in Kleppe was concerned with the timing of final impact statement
preparation. Contrary to fears expressed following SCRAP,
agencies have not abandoned the practice of preparing and
circulating draft EIS's.80 Clearly this offers an early, pre-decision
opportunity for an agency to consider environmental factors and
consequences of a given action and its alternatives. One of the
major purposes of the Act is full disclosure to the public of
environmental consequences and impacts related to a federal
action. The Kleppe decision does nothing to frustrate that purpose.
As noted earlier, the Court does clearly indicate that facts and
circumstances of a given situation may warrant or require a
cumulative or programmatic impart statement. The facts of Kleppe,
however, did not fit this category. The Court also paved the way for
"regional" impact statements when several proposals are
interrelated and are pending concurrently.81 The facts of the case
simply did not fall within the Court's view of a regional plan.
One indication of the implications of Kleppe is the lower courts'
reactions. None have required a formally designated proposal prior
to requiring an impact statement. The timing of EIS preparation
has been left to the discretion of the agencies, but the courts may
step in where the agency decision is arbitrary or unreasonable.8
The courts and the agencies have recognized the need for
cumulative and regional impact statements in proper situations.8 3
Thorough consideration of environmental factors and compliance
with the procedural mandates of section 102 of NEPA are still the
keys to proper agency actions.
The Court's latest encounter with the Act concerned primarily
the relationship between NEPA and the rulemaking provisions of
77. Id. at 406 n.15.
78. See NEPA 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1976).
79. 427 U.S. at 418 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. The validity of this statement may be discerned by a casual pertsal of the Federal Register
on almost any day.
81. 427 U.S. at 410. This portion ofthe opinion appears to allow finding ofa "regional" plan or
proposal based on action of an agency or simply a general set of facts. Clearly, the Court never
expresses a requirement of formal agency designation of a project as a prerequisite to NEPA
compliance. Id.
82. See Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld. 55 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977) Concerned
Citizens v. NRC, 430 F. Supp. 627 (D.R.I. 1977).
83. Sierra ChLib v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976). Conservation Law Foundation v.
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the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 84 Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC,85 was a consolidation of two cases
questioning the sufficiency of the procedures followed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for granting construction
and operating licenses for nuclear power plants. In the case dealing
with Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corporation, the Court analyzed
procedures that began with hearings before the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board and then the Atomic Energy Commission (now
NRC) concerning an application for an operating license. The
license was granted. Following an appeal to the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Appeal Board, the granting of the license was upheld.
NRDC objected to the granting of the license, and in particular to
the exclusion in the licensing hearings of evidence on the
environmental effect of the fuel reprocessing operation.
Subsequently, however, rulemaking proceedings were begun to
consider the environmental effects of the fuel cycle86 in nuclear
power plants. The Atomic Energy Commission issued a rule and to
the extent it differed from the Appeal Board's ruling, the rule
prevailed. However, since the impact of the fuel cycle had been
found to be minimal, the AEC determined not to apply the rule to
Vermont Yankee's environmental reports. NRDC appealed both
the adoption of the rule and the granting of Vermont Yankee's
license to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The court indicated that in the "absence of effective rulemaking
proceedings, the Commission must deal with the environmental
impact of fuel reprocessing and disposal in individual licensing
prcceedings. "87 The court then found the rulemaking proceedings,
although in compliance with section 553 of the APA, to be
insufficient and remanded the matter to the AEC. The AEC ruling
on the license application was also remanded. 88
In the companion case, the focus was an application for
construction of a nuclear facility by Consumers Power Company,
near Midland, Michigan. The application was initially studied by
AEC staff persons and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-
guards (ACRS). Two environmental groups intervened and
GSA, 427 F. Soipp. 1369 (D.R.I. 1977). Note for example that the Department of Energy will
prepare a programmatic impact statement for the National Energy Plan. (9 ENVIR. RFP. (BNA) 1255
(1978)).
84. 5 U.S.C. SS 551, 553 (1976).
85. 435 U.S. 519(1978).
86. The Court partially explains the concept of "ful cycle" in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, n.6 528 (1978). Essentially, the term refers to a series of activities
beginning with the mining of uranium ore and going through final disposal of nuclear wastes. See also
NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633.637n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
87. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
88. Id. at 655.
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opposed the application. Hearings were held and a draft EIS was
issued. Following a comment period, a final statement was
prepared. Further hearings were conducted, in which the
intervenors chose not to participate. Ultimately the permit was
granted by the Licensing Board and review was denied by the
Commission. At about this same time the Council on
Environmental Quality revised its Guidelines to require
consideration of energy conservation alternatives in the NEPA
process. The requirement was to apply only to final environmental
impact statements filed after January 28, 1974. The EIS for the
licensing of Consumers Power had issued in March of 1972 and did
not include a consideration of energy conservation alternatives.
Nonetheless, AEC did review the matter, concluding it should
decline to reopen the proceedings. Again, appeal to the circuit
court followed. The court initially found the Eis to be deficient due
to lack of discussion of energy conservation alternatives.8 9 The
court also determined the ACRS report was defective and that
AEC should have remanded it for more investigation. 90 Finally, it
found all fuel cycle questions to be controlled by the companion
case (Vermont Yankee) and remanded all of these issues to AEC.91
On appeal the Supreme Court was faced with issues involving
the APA and NEPA. It is, of course, difficult to separate these
issues completely. However, there will be no discussion or analysis
here of the issues solely involving the APA. 92 The primary focus of
this author's review of the Court's decision will be on the NEPA
and NEPA-related issues.
While substantively this case may have been cause for concern
for anti-nuclear forces, it does no discernible damage to NEPA.
The first NEPA question dealt with by the Court was whether
NEPA requires procedures beyond those set out in section 553 of
the APA when an agency is investigating factual issues through
rulemaking. The Court apparently had little difficulty in rejecting
NRDC's claim that NEPA does require additional procedures. 93
The Court referred to its position in SCRAP, that nothing in NEPA
explicitly, or by implication, repeals any other statute and
reemphasized its holding in Kleppe that the only procedures
89. Aeschilman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622. 628 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
90. Id. at 632.
91. Id.
92. A thorough, comprehensive and biting analysis of this aspect of the case may be found in K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIES 5§ 6:35 - -(2d ed. 1978). See also Breyer, Byse, Stewart,
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Three Perspectives, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1804 (1978).
93. 435 v.s. at 548.
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mandated by NEPA were those expressly contained in the Act
itself.94 There is certainly nothing inherently devastating with this
ruling. The procedures mandated by NEPA and clarified at that
time by the CEQ Guidelines 95 call for the careful, conscientious
agency to thoroughly consider the environmental ramifications of a
particular federal action. Further, nothing in Vermont Yankee
prevents an agency from employing procedures above and beyond
those required by NEPA or the APA if it so desires. All the opinion
prohibits is court imposed procedures beyond the statutory
minimum. 96
The Court then analyzed the decision of AEC not to consider
the issue of energy conservation alternatives in the Consumers
Power application and impact statement. The AEC, in refusing to
reopen the Consumers Power proceedings, indicated that
consideration of alternatives in the context of NEPA and agency
licensing procedures required consideration only of "reasonably
available alternatives" 97 and found that the intervenors' energy
conservation contentions filed with the Licensing Board did not
meet this threshold requirement. It was further determined that the
intervenors had failed to present any evidence with regard to their
energy conservation contentions. The AEC also determined that
since energy conservation is a novel and evolving concept, it was
not bound to apply the CEQ's guidelines revision retroactively.
The Circuit Court found AEC's action to be arbitrary, capricious
and contrary to the mandate of NEPA, 9 rejecting the
Commissions' threshhold test, that AEC must do more than sit
back and resolve the issues squarely before it. The Commissions'
duty is to conduct its own investigation and analysis of issues which
an intervenor has adequately presented.
The Supreme Court again rejected the circuit court's
resolution of this issue. The Court recognized the requirement for
thorough consideration of alternatives under NEPA. But, the
alternatives required under the Act are those which are reasonable
and not wildly speculative. 99  Furthermore, an agency's
consideration of alternatives pursuant to section 102 (2) (C) cannot
94. Id.
95. 40 CFR 1500-1508.28.
96. Id. at 524.
97. Id. at 533.
98. 547 F.2d at 629.
99. 435 U.S. at 551. The Court pointed out that even the District of Columbia Circuit, the court
which decided this case below, has expressly stated in another decision that only "reasonable" alter-
natives need be the subject of analysis in the EIS. Id. See NRDC v. Morton. 458 F.2d 827, 837-38
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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be criticized simply because the agency neglected to analyze every
possible alternative.100 Inclusion of speculative and far-fetched
alternatives adds nothing of value to an EIS and may indeed cloud
other more validly presented issues. Specifically, the Court found
"energy conservation" as a subject for discussion of alternatives
was almost limitless in scope and thus very unwieldy.' 0 1 Moreover,
the fact that the effective date of the CEQ's Guidelines revision,
requiring consideration of energy conservation alternatives, was
not until two years after the final EIS preparations for licensing
Consumers Power, demonstrated to the Court that the concept of
energy conservation alternatives is an evolving one. 10 2 Therefore,
the Licensing Board acted within its statutory authority in granting
the license. 10 3 The Court did note that it is "incumbent upon
intervenors who wish to participate to structure their participation
so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the
intervenors' position and contentions.' 01 4 The Court thus found
no heavy or impossible burdens placed upon intervenors by AEC's
threshold test and therefore rejected the portion of the circuit
court's decision finding fault with the test. Finally, the Court
reiterated its overall view of NEPA. It saw that Act as setting forth
substantial substantive goals, but mandating only procedures to be
implemented by the agencies. 10 5 The Court recognized that the
purpose of the Act is to guarantee that agencies make
environmentally thoughtful and informed decisions. However, the
Court concludes that the power of the courts in reviewing NEPA
activity does not include the power to substitute their judgment for
agency judgment on the merits of a project, or even to conduct
substantive review of agency decisions. 1
06
Vermont Yankee does not represent a setback to en-
vironmentalists insofar as NEPA analysis is concerned. 10 7 It
clarified that NEPA does not amend or repeal any other statutes. It
held that NEPA does not require procedures in agency rulemaking
beyond those mandated by the APA. The Court's statements
regarding the role of the intervenor could be read as placing an
affirmative duty on such parties to initially raise questions as to
alternatives. Such a reading would relieve the agencies of their clear
100. 435 U.S. at 551.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 553.
1 04. Id.
105. Id. at 558.
106. Id.
107. Although, considering the philosophical issues surrounding proliferation of nutclear power,
the decision is a blow to environmentalists and anti-nuclear forces.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
duty under NEPA to take the initiative with regard to considering
alternatives. A more reasonable interpretation of this portion of the
Court's opinion is one which requires agency consideration only of
"reasonable alternatives." Where an intervenor, or environmental
plaintiff, wishes consideration of more obscure alternatives, it will
be the duty of that party to raise questions and concerns about the
particular proposition. This latter interpretation does not allow
agency avoidance of NEPA duties. It will, in fact, allow avoidance
of time consuming speculative analysis of remotely relevant
alternatives. Finally, the Court reiterated its belief that the Act is
essentially procedural. None of these statements or holdings inflicted
any damage on NEPA from an environmental viewpoint. The
agencies are still bound to make their decisions in an
environmentally sound manner. Full and thorough consideration
of a wealth of alternatives is still necessary. The idea that NEPA
contains substantive goals has been confirmed by the Court. The
Court did clarify that judicial review under NEPA is "limited" to
procedural review. This does not necessarily cripple NEPA either.
The procedural mandates of the Act are so broad that thorough
procedural review will generally go to the substance of a particular
federal action. 108
NEPA has not been emasculated by the Supreme Court in any
of the cases discussed above. Clearly, the Act is alive and
functioning quite well. The Court has not interpreted it totally to
the liking of hard-line environmentalists and has undoubtedly
declined to assert jurisdiction over cases in which environmentalists
had a strong interest. 10 9 It is also clear the Court has not taken an
"activist" role with regard to NEPA. On the other hand, it has
not, as argued above, stripped the lower courts or agencies of their
powers and duties under the Act. It has not even seriously
hampered the courts or agencies.
II. NEW CEQ REGULATIONS: AN ADDITIONAL SHOT IN
THE ARM FOR NEPA
CEQ's new regulations (hereinafter the regulations) for the
implementation of NEPA 110 should dispell all lingering doubts as to
108. See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAXW § 7.4-5 (1977). For an analysis of NEPA
application to rulemaking in particular see Comment, 126 U. Penn L. Rev. 148 (1977). Note this ar-
ticle was written prior to the Court's decision in Vermont Yankee.
109. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Sec. of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2nd Cir. 1977); Minnesota
Ptiblic Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
110. 43 Fed. Reg. 55, 990 (1978). The regulations will be found ultimately at 40 C.F.R. S§
1500-1508.28.
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the Act's continued viability. This development comes on the heels
of Vermont Yankee and naturally takes into account the other
Supreme Court interpretations of NEPA discussed above. The
regulations are intended to replace not only the existing CEQ
Guidelines, but also more than 70 sets of existing agency
regulations for NEPA implementation. CEQ's action is in response
to an Executive Order issued by President Carter."' The
regulations will provide all federal agencies with uniform
procedures and, unlike the Guidelines, will be binding on all the
agencies. 1 ' CEQ has expressed an intention that the regulations
accomplish the following goals: 1) reduction of paperwork, 2)
reduction of delay, and 3) better decision making. 1 3 An analysis of
whether CEQ has successfully incorporated these goals, as well as
judicial interpretations of NEPA, in the regulations follows in this
section of the article.
The reduction of paperwork in the NEPA process is an
admirable goal. Impact statements have, on occasion, become so
lengthy that the public has undoubtedly had difficulty dealing with
them. 1 4 The most obvious paperwork reduction measure proposed
by CEQ is a page limitation on impact statements. For routine
proposals the limit will be 150 pages, while complex or far-reaching
proposals may have statements up to 300 pages.1 1 5 Such a
requirement is a readily available, mechanical way to keep the size
of the statements under control. The only difficulty which might
arise is an agency contending it has a "complex" project which will
require a 300 page EIS. This rule will not directly affect the
decision-making process and will not provide a basis for
challenging the adequacy of an impact statement." 6 The limits are
a reasonable step.
The regulations will require more in-depth analysis, as
opposed to sheer bulk." 7 Impact statements are directed to be
concise, with discussion of environmental impacts to be
1 1. Exec. Order No. 11,991,3 C.F.R. 123 (1977 Comp.).
112. 40 C.F.R. 5 1500.3. There is one exception to the binding nature of the regulations. They
will not be binding where they are inconsistent with other statutory requirements of the agency. Id.
113. 43 Fed. Reg. 55, 978-80 (1978).
114. For example, the recently issued Department of Interior final EIS for Development of Coal
Resources in Southwestern Wyoming is about 5 inches thick! This statement covers only a small
aspect of coal development nationally. Documents of this size can be quite intimidating to the lay
public, for whom an EIS is, in part, intended.
115. 40 C.F.R. S 1502.7.
116. Id. The limits do not seem to be mandatory due to the "shall normally" phraseology. This
1langtage appears to give a bit of flexibility to the requirements.
117. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(a).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
proportional to their significance.1 18 The "scoping process ' 119
required should assist the agencies in keeping the statements
concise and relevant to significant impacts. The impact statements
must be in plain language in order to be understood by both the
general public and the decision makers.120 In an attempt to
encourage uniformity, the regulations have established a detailed
recommended format for impact statements. '
2
1
Emphasis on alternatives under consideration is also
required. 22 CEQ's position appears to be that this is the "heart"
of a thorough EIS and thus the proper place for emphasis. By
keying in on the critical portions of an impact statement and
downplaying excess baggage, it is apparently hoped that impact
statements will be more readable, more compact and thus enable
the goal of better decision-making to be achieved.
Several provisions are included which are aimed at
minimizing confusion and repetition. Summaries of the substance
of the EIS must be included and circulated in lieu of the full EIS
where the document is unusually long and complex. 123 Circulation
of the summary, of course, should not be seen as a way of hiding
problems or deficiencies in a project. It is intended as a paperwork
reduction and clarification tool. Utilization of program or policy
statements and tiering of statements from 'broad scope to narrow
scope is directed by the regulations and is seen as a way to cut down
repetition. 24 It is indicated that tiering "may also be appropriate
for different stages of actions.' 1 25 The regulations also require
extensive cooperation with state and local agencies and officials, as
well as cooperation among the various federal agencies. The
purpose here is expressly to reduce duplication of efforts. 126
There are two other regulations which will definitely reduce
agency paperwork and, perhaps, indirectly benefit the public. One
of these is the availability of categorical exclusions from the
regulations and, of course, NEPA. Naturally, this would be for
actions which would not significantly affect the environment. 27
This regulation obviously means agencies may have one less
118. 40 C. F. R. § 1502.2 (b), (c).
119. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7. The concept of "scoping" is analyzed further in conjunction with
CEQ's goal of better decisionmaking. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
120. 40C.F.R. 5 1502.8.
12 1. 40C. F.R. 1502. 10.
122. 40C.F.R. S 1500.4(f), 1502.14.
123. 40 C.F.R. 1502.12, 1502.19.
124. 40 C.F.R. S 1502.20.
125. Id.
126. 40C.F.R. §§ 1506.2, 1505.3.
127. 40C.F.R. %1508.4.
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category of actions to which NEPA applies and can, theoretically,
turn their full attention to more environmentally significant issues.
The other section would allow a "Finding of No Significant
Impact" to be issued where no EIS will be required. 1 28 The
document must include a brief environmental assessment of
proposed action and a brief statement of reasons why the action will
have no significant impact. 12 9 A record of the agency decision is
thus preserved in case of challenge and paperwork has been
significantly reduced.
CEQ also intends to reduce delay in the NEPA process
through promulgation of these regulations. This, too, is an
admirable goal. Preparation of an impact statement is inherently
time-consuming and any efforts to cut down the required time,
without jeopardizing the quality of work product, is clearly
desirable. The NEPA process also has a history of being
interrupted and thus delayed by litigation. 130 In a vein similar to
paperwork reduction efforts, the most obvious delay reduction facet
involved is encouragement of time limits for EIS preparation. No
universally applicable limits are set. It is left to the agencies, with
ample CEQ guidance, to set up timetables for the process."'3 There
are, however, specific time limits established for review and
comment on impact statements. 1
32
The bulk of the delay reducing measures focus on the early
planning stages of the NEPA process. There is an emphasis on
interagency cooperation early in the process, as well as elaborate
provisions intended to resolve swiftly and fairly conflicts among
potential "lead agencies.' 1 33 The regulations require agencies to
integrate planning efforts and the NEPA process at the earliest
possible stage. 134 The agencies are further directed to utilize the
'"scoping" process to quickly identify crucial issues, as well as
irrelevant issues. 35 Finally, the agencies are to begin impact
statement preparation at the earliest possible stage of the planning
process. 136 This is to ensure that the document will be an integral
part of the decision-making process and not merely used to justify
an already made decision. This aspect of the regulations further
designates the proper timing of statements where the agency is
128. 40C.F.R. § 1508.13.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1976); EDF v. Corps, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
131. 40C. F. R. 5 1501.8.
132. 40C.F.R. g 1506.10.
133. 40C.F.R. §§ 1501.5, 1501.6.
134. 40C.F.R. g 1501.2.
135.40 C.F.R. g 1501.7. See infra accompanying text and notes 159-160.
136. 40C.F.R. § 1502.5.
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responding to some outside initiative, and where the agency is
involved in adjudication. 137 This section, combined with the
definition of "proposal ' 138 contained in the regulations, should
silence the critics of Kleppe. NEPA requirements cannot be avoided
merely by failing to formally designate or announce a proposal.
NEPA compliance cannot be put off until the last possible moment
and then used to justify the decision. A clear mandate for early
environmental consideration is found in the regulations.
'he requirements for categorical exclusions and "findings of
no significant impact" will also aid the agencies in reducing
delay. 139 The regulations also provide an accelerated NEPA
schedule for legislative proposals. 140 The section eliminates the
"scoping" requirement and the necessity of a final impact
statement. It also allows reduction of the review and comment
period. 141 At first glance, this section appears to sanction avoidance
of crucial NEPA requirements, which would result in inadequate
impact statements. However, the legislative process has been a
traditionally incompatible framework for NEPA compliance.142
The courts have had difficulty with NEPA and legislative
proposals.1 43 NEPA compliance simply is not required for all
legislative proposals. 144 Furthermore, the legislative process is
subject to such constant changes that "traditional" NEPA
compliance is very difficult. That is to say, an individual piece of
legislation proposed by an agency, and theoretically accompanied
by an EIS, may not look at all like the proposal originally submitted
once it is passed. A very good argument can be made that a full and
complete EIS represents a lot of wasted agency time and effort. It is
suggested, therefore, the short cuts allowed for legislative proposals
in the regulations will have no detrimental effects on the NEPA
process. In fact, this section may even provide a basis for better
impact statements for legislative proposals by "integrating" the
NEPA process with schedules inherent in the legislative process. 1 45
Potentially the most controversial delay reduction factor is a
section clearly delineating when judicial review of the NEPA
process is allowable. 146 The section states CEQ's intention that
137. Id.
138.40 C.F.R. S 1508.23.
139. 40C.F.R. § 1508.4, 1508.13.
140. 40 C.F.R. 5 1506.8.
141. Id
142. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.2 (1977).
143. Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Callaway, 431 F. Supp. 722 (D.C. Cir.
1977): Wingfield v. OMB. 9 ERC 1961 (1977); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 11 ERC 1625 (1978), rev'd on
other grounds, - U.S. 99 S.C.T. 2335 (1979).




judicial review of NEPA activity, particularly compliance with the
regulations, not occur until after an agency has filed a final impact
statement. Review may also occur after a finding of no significant
impact. An argument could be made that such a provision
drastically diminishes the role of the courts vis-a-vis NEPA.
However, the great bulk of NEPA litigation over the years has
focused either on the details of a final impact statement or on the
agency's failure to file an impact statement. This section of the
regulations contains another clause which should mitigate any
criticism of the concept. .Judicial review is possible where the
agency may be taking "action that will result in irreparable
injury. ''147
The most idealistic, and at the same time the most significant,
goal of the regulations is to provide for better decision making.
Obviously, CEQ intends the entire set of regulations to form the
basis for better decisions. It should also be clear at this point that
many of the sections noted above will assist the agencies in making
better decisions. Several specific sections, however, stand out and
require further analysis. For the sake of discussion these will be
divided into those which provide for mechanically bettei decisions
and those which provide for substantively better decisions. The
delineations are not always clear, but it does not matter so long as
the ultimate goal of"better decision making" is remembered.
The regulations will require agencies to adopt regulations
governing their NEPA activities. 148 The natural response to this
requirement is confusion. After all, these regulations are supposed
to replace existing regulations and instill uniformity. Actually the
procedures required by section 1505.1 are to supplement the CEQ
regulations and to aid in implementing them. 149 These inhouse
regulations are not supposed to paraphrase NEPA. 150 Essentially
the purpose appears to be to ensure compliance with substantive
NEPA goals, procedural NEPA mandates and the CEQ
regulations. This is accomplished by each agency setting up
procedures which key note "typical" agency activities which will
be subject to NEPA and the regulations. 1 5 1 The procedures will also
highlight the points in these activities at which various NEPA
procedures or considerations are brought into play. The agencies
must also set out requirements clarifying what sorts of documents
147. Id.
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and records will be a part of the official record of various agency
actions and what documents and records will accompany the
EIS.152 Yet another section of the regulations requires agencies to
make a public record of its decision and reasons thereof, 153 in
addition to the impact statement or a finding of no significant
impact. This documentation of agency action is still another way of
informing the public, making the agency accountable to the public.
It will also aid the courts in reviewing NEPA controversies. 
154
The regulations contain several mandates which should
readily assist in producing substantively better decisions. There is
an express command to apply NEPA early in the agency planning
process. 155 At the early stages of the planning process the agencies
must begin the "scoping" required by the regulations. 156 The
purpose behind the "scoping" process is early identification of
significant issues to be analyzed in the NEPA process. The section
sets out extensive and rather elaborate requirements for
"scoping." These include clear delineation of significant issues,
allocation of EIS preparation assignments, reception of input from
relevant government and private sources, identification of issues
which may overlap or conflict with on-going activities of other
federal agencies, and coordination of timing and scheduling of the
decision making process. 157 The "scoping" process should provide
a good framework for early environmental considerations by
agencies. The agencies should be able to use the process to
immediately put all their resources into the environmentally
significant aspects of a particular action. This requirement will
make it difficult for agencies to ignore until the last minute
environmental impacts of potential plans or programs. The
"scoping" process should be an excellent mechanism for
preventing preparation of impact statements which do no more
than justify agency decisions.
As noted above, CEQ views consideration of alternatives as
the most crucial aspect of the NEPA process. Accordingly,
extensive directions are given to the agencies for inclusion in this
portion of the process. 58 Agencies must present their alternatives
in "comparative form.' 1 59 The intent here is to fully inform the
152. 40C.F.R. %1505.1(c)(d) (e).
153. 40 C.F.R. 1505.2.
154. In the past the courts have had difficulty analyzing NEPA questions due to inadequate
records. See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 646 (2nd Cir. 1972).
155. 40C.F.R. g 1501.2.
156. 40 C.F.R. 1501.7.
157. 40 C.F.R. 51501.7(a).




public of the pros and cons of the various alternatives. It should also
bring the key issues of the plan or program into focus. Only
reasonable alternatives need be discussed; but for those which are
eliminated, the agency must give some sort of justification for the
elimination.1 60 This requirement, coupled with the requirement of
detailed analysis, 161 should ensure that no alternatives are short-
changed during the process. The proposed regulations required
early identification of the environmentally preferable alternative
and the reason for such designation. 62 This requirement does not
appear in the final regulations. It was removed in an attempt to
give the agencies some flexibility. 163 The environmentally
preferable alternative is, however, required to appear in the
decision record. 164 This weakens one of the most desirable aspects
of the regulations. The public and other agencies should be
informed early in the process as to the best alternative from an
environmental viewpoint. By allowing designation after the impact
statement is prepared, at least the appearance of less than thorough
consideration of alternatives is created.
The agency is further required to clearly identify the
alternative which it prefers and to set reasons for the choice. 165 This
section leaves the agencies no option. They must analyze and
investigate all reasonable alternatives, not merely those suggested
by .outsiders and not just those within, their jurisdiction. Full
consideration of alternatives ideally results in environmentally
sound decisions. A complete record of the process assists in
reaching the goal of a better decision.
The regulations encourage the agencies to tier their impact
statements where appropriate. 66 In other words, where a far-
reaching policy is announced or broad program is formulated, a
broad EIS should be prepared. Subsequently, as agency focus
narrows, for example to regional or local levels, necessary impact
statements should narrow their focus. The idea is to avoid
duplication of efforts. The primary benefit is allowance of agency
concentration on the issues at hand at the particular stage being
discussed. In the Kleppe context this regulation would require
national level coal issues to be the heart of the programmatic EIS,
regional (theoretically) issues to be the crux of a regional impact
160. 40C.F.R. § 15 02.14(a).
161. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(b).
162. § 1502.14(c) of proposed regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 25, 230 (1978).
163. 43 Fed, Reg. 55, 990 (1978).
164. 40 C.F. R. § 1505.2(b).
165. 40C.F.R. § 1502.14(e).
166. 40 C.F. R. § 1502.20.
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statement and site specific issues to be the focal point of statements
for an individual coal mine or related project. 167 It should be noted
that this concept does not allow for avoidance of cumulative
impacts; it merely allows greater attention to be paid to matters
immediately before the agencies.
A final tool for better decision-making is a series of sections
defining key terms found in the Act and the entire NEPA process.
These definitions clarify vague language and in some instances
incorporate court interpretations. The "human environment" is
defined by the regulations. 168 The definition excludes actions which
will have solely economic and social impact. This section should
eliminate reliance on NEPA as a tool to prevent closing of military
bases, 169 to obtain more favorable trucking routes, 1 0 to avoid
imposition of racially mixed low income housing,' 7 ' and other such
actions. The term "major federal action" is also defined."17 This
too has been the subject of litigation'73 and the section should cut
down the frequency of such controversies by delineating the types
of actions which fall within this term. "Significantly" is also
included in this portion of the regulations. 7 4 This term has also
been a major source of controversy in NEPA litigation. 7 5 The
elaborate definition contained in this section should aid the
agencies in making their threshold decisions as to NEPA
applicability and aid the public in scrutinizing these same agency
decisions. The final significant term defined by the regulations is
''proposal. 11176 This is obviously an attempt to fill in the gaps left
by the Supreme Court in SCRAP and Kleppe. The section makes
clear that a proposal could well exist "in fact" as well as by formal
agency announcement. This supports the arguments raised earlier
that SCRAP and Kleppe do not cripple NEPA by allowing agencies
to put off compliance until the last possible moment. According to
the definition, a proposal is the stage at which an agency has a goal
and is beginning to consider possible ways of accomplishing that
goal. This offers some assistance in implementing the Kleppe
holding. It provides a discernable point at which the agency should
167. For yet another actually utilized example of tiering see County of Suffolk v. Dept. of
Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2nd Cir. 1977).
168. 40C.F.R. § 1508.14.
169. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
170. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975).
171. See, e.g., Nucleus ofChicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975).
172. 40C.F.R. §1508.18.
173. See, e.g., Scottsdale Mall v. State ofIndiana, 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977); Carolina Action
v. Simon, 389 F. SUpp. 1244 (M.P.N.C. 1975).
174. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.
175. See, e.g., Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Julius v. Cedar Rapids, 349 F.
Supp. 88 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
176. 40C.F.R. 1508.23.
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have prepared a final EIS. Naturally, if an agency has complied
with these regulations, NEPA factors will have been a focal point
for some time.
As should be clear now, the regulations are a valid attempt to
streamline and improve the NEPA process. They provide some
answers to questions, either left open or only partially answered by
the Courts. The substantive aspects of NEPA are very much in
evidence in the regulations. The time frames provided and the
reduction of paperwork envisioned should improve the process.
There is finally a clear policy running through the regulations of
public awareness and public participation. Informed decision-
making and full disclosure as integral parts of the daily agency
process should be a giant step closer to reality when these
regulations become effective. 177
III. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR NEPA?
As noted early in this article, after almost nine years of
existence many rules regarding NEPA are clear. The Supreme
Court has been responsible for some clarification and some
confusion. CEQ's regulations should clarify more aspects of the
process. It would, of course, be naive to think the regulations
themselves will not also become a source of controversy in the
future. Not all is clear with NEPA. Some issues remain unresolved.
There are facets of the Act which still require definitive judicial
interpretation. Other issues, of course, may arise which have not
yet been the subject ofjudicial scrutiny. '78
One unresolved NEPA issue expressly excluded from the CEQ
regulations is the application of NEPA to major federal actions
abroad. 17 9 The question has been expressly left open in two recent
cases, involving highway construction in Central America'80 and
spraying of Mexican marijuana."8 Another case has recently been
filed in which the plaintiffs are contending NEPA is applicable to
construction of housing on a United States Army installation in
West Germany. 82 The factual setting of this case may well be such
177. The effective date is July 30, 1979; until that time the CEQ Guidelines remain effective.
C.F.R. § 1506.12.
178. This type of issue is naturally more speculative than others covered in this section and will
not be fiurther discussed. The same can be said of the possibility of congressional amendment of the
Act.
179. The preamble to proposed CEQNEPA regulations does not refer to possible international
applications. 43 Fed. Reg. 55, 978-990 (1978).
180. Sierra Club v. Adams, __ F.2d __ (1IERC 1454) D.C. Cir. 1978).
181. NORML v. United States, __ F. Supp. - (II ERC 1841)(D.D.C. 1978).
182. 9 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 1169 (1978).
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that the court will be unable to avoid answering the question. An
answer to the question may well come from another source much
sooner. The President has recently issued an Executive Order
setting out categories of actions abroad for which NEPA
compliance will be required. 183 The order excludes from NEPA
compliance activities involving export licenses, permits, and other
export-related actions which might have an environmental impact
in foreign countries.1 84 Nuclear reactor construction and other
activities will require NEPA compliance. Within government, the
application of the Act abroad has been a source of controversy
between CEQ and the Department of State. Both have been
consulted during formulation of the Executive Order. 18 5 It is likely
the Executive Order will not be the final word. It is a safe bet the
courts will still be called upon to clarify the foreign application of
NEPA.
Another issue which remains somewhat unresolved is the
applicability of the Act to the full range of agency decision-making
processes. In other words, is NEPA applicable to "policy"
decisions and, if so, when in the formulation of agency policy is it
applicable? In the same vein, is NEPA applicable to broad,
undefined "programs?" If so, what exactly is a program? Professor
McGarity argues that NEPA application should not be
mechancial. 186 He advocates early consideration of NEPA factors
and mandates when agencies are merely formulating policies, as
opposed to more concrete programs. Kleppe did not explicitly deal
with this question. A narrow reading of Kleppe would preclude
application in the situations he advocates. However, a more
generous interpretation of the case, in conjunction with the CEQ
regulations, would necessitate NEPA procedures to be part and
parcel of the policy making process.
The question of what is the proper scope of a programmatic
EIS was also not thoroughly dealt with in Kleppe. The Court gave
some guidance, but only in passing. 18 7 The CEQ regulations also
shed some light on the question. 18 8 Lower courts have attempted to
grapple with the question also, but appear to be content to handle it
on a case by case basis. 18 9
Another question which has never been clearly answered is the
183. Exec. Order Pno. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. McGarity. The Courts, the Agencies, andNEPA Threshold Issues, 55Tex. L. Rev. 801 (1977).
187. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
188. 40C.F.R. § 1502.4.
189. See, e.g.. Nebraska v. Rtral Electrification Administration. ___ F. Sitpp. - (12 ERC
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effect of CEQ or the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
opposition to another agency's project. Such opposition would be
registered as a result of their roles as reviewers of impact
statements. 190  The courts have never clearly dealt with the
question, although Mr. Justice Douglas, in the role of circuit
justice, indicated such disapproval must be given substantial
deference by the courts in determining the adequacy of an EIS.191
The CEQ regulations set up definite procedures for referral of
controversial decisions to CEQ and cooperating agencies.
192
However, they do not give CEQ or any other agency veto power,
and no guidance is given to the courts as to the weight accorded
such a ruling. There is a live controversy as this is written which
could provide some answer to the question. CEQ and EPA have
both objected to the Denver Foothills Project, a proposal to add to
the sewage treatment capacity for metropolitan Denver. 193 The
Department of Interior and Department of Agriculture had both
approved minor portions of the project. 194 The next step is Army
Corps of Engineers approval of a construction permit, to which
EPA has also lodged an objection.' 95 Regardless of whether the
permit is granted, litigation is sure to follow. Such litigation may
well require resolution of the question of the impact of EPA or
CEQ objection to a proposal.
There are numerous other questions which may surface. The
issue of whether "inaction" can be action for purposes of triggering
NEPA is also in dispute and may soon be resolved. 196 The Supreme
Court may well provide some insight into the extent of NEPA
compliance necessary for proposals for legislation. 197 Finally, an
issue thought to be dead has recently been revived. This issue is the
scope of NEPA compliance necessary on the part of EPA. EPA is
currently generally exempt from NEPA requirements for most of
its activities. 198 The rationale is that most of EPA's actions are
1156) (1978):See also note, 30 Stan. I.. Rev. 767 (1978) in whitch the aithor advocates an interesting,
probably quite workable test, for determining if a programmatic impact statement is necessary in a
given setting.
190. EPA reviews most impact statements ptrstant to section 7609 of the Clean Air Act and
refers those deemed ,insatisfactory or tnso,ind to CEO fur ,rtber review. 42 U .S.C. § 7609 (1978).
191. Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974).
192. 40 C. F.R. §l 1504.1, 1504.2, 1504.3.
193. 8 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 1816(1978).
194. Id.
195. 9 Envir. Rep, (BNA) 154(1978).
196. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andnts, __ F. S,tpp. , (9ERC 2111) (D.D.C. 1977);
Alaska v. Andros, 429 F. Siipp. 958 (D. Alas. 1977). A thoight provoking analysis of this isste can
be foLnd in Fergenson, The Sin of Omission: Inaction as Action Under Section 102 (2) (C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 53 Ind. L.J. 97 (1978).
197. See supra note 9.
198. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaous, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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environmentally protective. However, in a recent report, the
Government Accounting Office questioned the validity of this
exemption. 99 GAO indicated it felt a voluntary program of EIS
preparation conducted by EPA has been inadequate. It
recommended Congress re-evaluate the efficacy of EPA's
exemption. 200 EPA responded, quite naturally, with opposition to
GAO's position. EPA contended EIS preparation would unduly
interfere with its environmentally protective programs. Congress,
not the courts, may well provide the answer to this question.
There are undoubtedly other issues which could be included
above as unresolved and possibly subject to future dispute. The
above are the most significant, however. Resolution of these issues
will probably not substantially alter the present environmentally
positive assessment of NEPA. As noted above, the Act has at times
been subject to differing, controversial interpretations. Generally
speaking, however, the Act is functioning effectively. Envi-
ronmental factors must be considered throughout the decision-
making process. Alternatives to proposed actions must be
thoroughly investigated and considered. The public must be kept
informed throughout this process of the factors entering into the
final decision. The courts, while not empowered to make a
substantive decision on the merits of a project, are certainly
available to review the sufficiency of agency procedures under
NEPA and the overall adequacy of impact statements prepared by
the agencies. NEPA has become a way of life for federal agencies. It
has not brought them to a standstill. Niether has the Supreme
Court brought NEPA to a standstill. NEPA is not dying on the vine
as the result of Supreme Court interpretations of the Act. Finally,
the CEQ regulations are an indication that the federal government
itself is continuously striving to improve the process.
199. 9 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 976 (1978).
200. Id.
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